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Abstract
In a production economy where a single private good is produced via a non-linear concave technology, no direct
mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness and efficiency if the preference domain contains the class of linear
preferences.
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1. Introduction
The trade-off between efficiency and strategy-proofness has been studied in great detail in the case of
the distribution and exchange of private goods. These concepts together lead to decidedly unfair
allocations of resources. Originating from a conjecture in Hurwicz (1972), this result was first proved in
the two-agent case (e.g. Kato and Ohseto, 2002; Ju, 2003; Schummer, 1997; Sprumont, 1995; Zhou,
1991) examining various domain restrictions. Recently, Serizawa (2002) formally established this
negative result for an arbitrary number of agents.
We study the same trade-off for simple production economies where a single private good is produced
via a concave technology. Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) show that strategy-proofness and efficiency
can coexist in a linear production model on the domain of classical economic preferences, even in
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combination with anonymity. They call the resulting unique solution the equal budget free choice
mechanism: every agent obtains the bundle she would choose if operating the technology alone.
We show that this positive result does not survive if the single technology is concave but not linear
(though not necessarily strictly concave). Then strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible on the
domain of linear preferences. Because strategy-proofness is a stronger property on larger domains, our
result extends to any domain containing the class of linear preferences.
Shenker (1992) considers a cost-sharing model that includes ours as a special case. He states that if
the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, any incentive compatible sharing rule is of the serial
type. This would imply our result as serial-like methods are not first-best efficient. Yet, our result
improves upon his statement on the strategy-proofness and efficiency trade-off in three respects. First of
all, Shenker imposes smoothness conditions on the technology and on the allocation rule, which we do
not. Secondly, his additional conditions on the technology amount in our setting to strict concavity of the
production function, which we do not require. Lastly, and more importantly, his incentive compatibility
criterion is much stronger than strategy-proofness: implementability in Nash equilibrium strategies is in
fact even stronger than group strategy-proofness.
2. The model and theorem
Let N={1, ..., n} be the set of agents. Let F be a strictly increasing, concave (though not
necessarily strictly concave) non-linear function of R+ to itself such that F(0)=0. A bundle is an
element zi=(xi, yi)aR+ R, and an allocation is a list of n bundles, z=(z1, ..., zn), one for each
agent. The set of feasible allocations is denoted by










For any subset SpN, we write xs ¼
P
ias xi and ys ¼
P
ias yi:
Each agent is endowed with a preference, Ri, over Rþ   R which is strictly monotonic: strictly
increasing in yi and strictly decreasing in xi. We denote by R0 the class of preferences. A preference
profile is a list of n preferences, R=(R1,... ,Rn). We sometimes write R=(Rj, R  j) for some jaN. Let
LoR0 be the class of linear preferences. Each preference LaL can be identified with a number laRþþ
that corresponds to the slope of its indifference curves in the (x, y)-plane. The corresponding utility for
agent i is ui(xi, yi)=yi lxi.
For any subset ApRþ   R and any preference relation RiaR, we define mðA; RiÞ¼f ziaAAbzV i
aAz iRizV ig to be the set of maximal elements of A according to Ri. For any preference profile RaRN,
we denote by
PEðRÞufzaZjbzVaZ½zV i Rizi biaNZzV iIizi biaN 
the set of Pareto-efficient allocations.
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Let RpR0 , a direct allocation mechanism (or mechanism) l : RN ! Z associates with each
preference profile a feasible allocation. We are interested in the following axioms to be verified by a
mechanism l:
Pareto efficiency (PE) bRaRN; lðRÞaPEðRÞ:
Strategy-proofness (SP) bRaRNbiaNbRV iaR; liðRÞRiliðRV i; R iÞ:
Theorem. Let LpRpR0. No mechanism l:R
N!Z satisfies SP and PE.
As in Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) we determine the shape of the agents option sets, i.e. the sets of
attainable bundles given the reports of others. We proceed by contradiction, assuming that a mechanism
l satisfies SP and PE to later show that the shapes of the option sets generated by l are not feasible;
namely, budget balance is violated.
We start the proof with two lemmas. Lemma 1 states a general property of option sets and can be
found in Maniquet and Sprumont (1999). Loosely speaking, Lemma 2 states that if a function f is
concave and if a function g has the same slope as f for every value of t in its domain, then g coincides
with f up to a positive constant. First, a definition: a strictly increasing subset of Rþ   R is a set ho
Rþ   R such that for all ðxi; yiÞ; ðxV i; yV iÞah; xi > xV iZyi > yV i.
Lemma 1. Let RpR0. A mechanism l : RN ! Z satisfies SP if and only if for every iaN, there exists a
correspondence Oi : RNqfig ! Rþ   R, such that for every RaRN,
(i) liðRÞamðOiðR iÞ; RiÞ,
(ii) OiðR iÞis a strictly increasing subset of R+ R.
Lemma 2. Let f: Rþ ! R be an increasing concave function and let g: D ! R with DpRþ. Let lmz0
and xm=supðargmaxtaD gðtÞ lmtÞ. Then, if
bla 0;lm½; arg max
taRþ
ðf ðtÞ ltÞtarg max
taD
ðgðtÞ ltÞp t; ð1Þ
(with the convention that arg max taR+ (f(t) lt)={+l}p t if l<limt ! lfV(t)), there exists aaR such
that g and f+a coincide on D \½ xm; þl .
Proof. Define, for any la]0, lm[,
wðlÞ¼max
tz0
f ðtÞ lt and hðlÞ¼max
taD
gðtÞ lt
Letting x(l) be a solution of maxt z 0f(t) lt, writing w(l)=f(x(l)) lx(l) yields that the derivative of w
at l equals wV(l)=xV(l)(f V(x(l)) l) x(l) with either fV(x(l))=l (in general) or xV(l)=0 (at a kink in
the graph of f ). I.e., wV(l)= x for some xaarg maxt z 0f(t) lt. From the concavity of f, arg maxt z 0
f(t) lt is single-valued everywhere except on a countable subset of values of l, corresponding to the
linear parts of f (if any). Similarly, the derivative of h at l equals hV(l)= x for some xaarg maxt a D
g(t) lt for any la]0, lm[.
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From (1), wV and hV must coincide almost everywhere on ]0, lm[. Hence,w and h coincide up to a
constant on ]0, lm[. Therefore f and g coincide up to a constant on D\[xm,+ l]. n
We now tackle the proof of the theorem. For the sake of contradiction let l:L
N!Z satisfy SP and PE.
For any LaL
N denote the corresponding vector of slopes (l1,... ,ln) and write l(L)=(xi, yi)iaN. Define l=
minjaN lj and J=arg minjaN lj. Denote by FV(resp. FV_) the derivative (resp. left-derivative) of F.
Because F is non-linear, we can assume




xi > 0 only if iaJ; ðaÞ
xN ¼ xJa arg maxðFðtÞ ltÞð bÞ and;
yN ¼ FðxNÞ: ðcÞ
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
ð3Þ
Condition (a) follows from trade efficiency: any agent i for which li>l and xi>0 would gladly pay
liþl
2
units of output in order to provide one less unit of input; any agent jaJ would accept to trade with i.( b)
follows from (a) and production efficiency. Condition (c) states that all the output is allocated.
Fix iaN and L  iaL
N\{i} until Step 5. We apply Lemma 1 and write Oi(L  i) the option set of agent i.
Define l 
i =minj p i lj and ˆ xi =max(arg max (F(t) l 
i t)). Notice that ˆ xi is finite because l 
i >limt ! l
FV(t) (from (2)). For any LiaL, denote by liaR++the corresponding slope. We write l(Li; L   i)=(xi(li),
yi(li))iaN.
Steps 2–4 are devoted to the description of the shape of Oi(L  i).
Step 2
OiðL iÞ\ð ½ 0; ˆ xi  RÞpfðx;yÞa½0; ˆ xi  Rjy ¼ ai þ l 
i xg for some aiaR:
Let li>l 
i , condition (3.a) requires xi(li)=0; denote ai=yi(li). We claim that zi (lVi)=(0, ai) for all lV i>l 
i
because of SP. Indeed, assume there existed some lV i>l 
i such that zi(lV i)=(0, aV i) with aV i,p ai.I faV i>ai,
agent i could benefit from reporting lV i at (Li, L  i); if the inequality were reversed, agent i could benefit
from reporting li at (LV i, L  i).
Now if lI=li
 , xi(li







 )=0, then yi(li
 )>ai and agent i can benefit from reporting li
  when her true
preference is in fact liV>li
 .I fxi(li




i Þ > l 
i ; agent i could benefit from reporting li
 
instead of liVa l 
i ; li*½. Therefore yi(li
 ) V ai+li
  xi(li




Also, for any li<li
 , xiðliÞzˆ xi; and if there exists some liV<li
  for which xiðliVÞ¼ˆ xi, the same
reasoning as above yields yiðliVÞ¼ai þ l 
i ˆ xi. Step 2 has been proved.
For the next step, we use the following notation: for any kaR, define B(k)={(xi, yi)aR+ Rjyi=
F(xi)+k}.
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Step 3
OiðL iÞ\ð ½ˆ xi;þl½ RÞoBðbiÞ for some bi a R.
Let x be the real-valued function whose graph is Oi(L  i) and Dits domain. We wish to apply Lemma
2 where F plays the role of f, x the role of g and where lm=li








  write li(L)=(xi, yi). From Lemma 1 (xi, yi)am (Oi(L  i), Li); therefore, by the definition
of x, xiaarg maxtaDx(t) lit. However, J={i} because li<li
 ; condition (3.b) yields xiaarg maxt z 0
F(t)–lit. We can apply Lemma 2 and conclude that x and F coincide up to a constant on ½ˆ xi;þl½.
Step 4
bi ¼ ai þ l 
i ˆ xi   Fðˆ xiÞ
By concavity of F and by definition of ˆ xi, F is strictly concave at ˆ xi. Therefore, limlzl 
i (arg max (F(t)
lt))= ˆ xi, and hence limlzl 
i xiðlÞ¼ˆ xi. Steps 2 and 3 yield the result.
Now that the shape of Oi(L  i) has been determined, we show that it is an implausible one. Note that
ai is actually a function of L–i; from now on we write ai(L–i). For any LaL
N let ln   1
* denote the
second smallest entry of the corresponding vector of slopes (l1,. . . ,ln)aR++









N and the corresponding (l1,... ,ln)aR+
N. Recall that J=arg minjaN lj; clearly Jp t. Step
1 requires xi=0 and yi=ai(L  i) for all igJ.I fjJj=1, say J={j}, then yi=aj(L  j)+ln   1










n 1Þ by construction of ˆ xj:
Now suppose jJjz2, then l 
n 1 ¼ l
¯
. Moreover, for any jaJ, xjz0, yj=aj(L  j)+ln   1
* xj and xJaarg
max F(t)–ln   1
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Upon noticing that h is strictly decreasing on  l
¯
; FVð0Þ½, a slight variation of a standard argument
in the literature on Clarke–Grove mechanisms (omitted for brevity but available upon request) yields
a contradiction: (l1,. . . ,ln)ih(ln   1
* ) cannot be decomposed into n functions depending only on
n 1 variables.
Remark. We strongly suspect that our proof technique successfully applies to the many-inputs-one-
output case without many conceptual modifications.
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